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The Victim's Role in Criminal Prosecutions
in Ethiopia
Stanley Z. Fisher

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to review developments which have occurred
in the victim’s role in criminal prosecutions under Ethiopian law. In contrast
to the penal laws of modern Western states, which define a wide range of
wrongful conduct as offensive to the state itself, the traditional Ethiopian law
of wrongs viewed relatively few offenses thus. For the most part, the state
confined itself to legitimating and assisting the victim’s own efforts to obtain
redress.

As in ancient European societies, so in the Ethiopian society
before 1930 the neat modern division of legal wrongs into “penal”
(public) and “civil” (private) ones was unknown. With few excep
tions, as those of religious sacrilege or acts injuring the Emperor
and his realm, wrongs now known as “penal” (e.g., homicide, rape
or robbery) were private in the sense that they were not prosecuted
by organs of the Empire, but were redressed at the instance of the
victim or his blood-relatives, who were free to sue, not sue, or
compromise the issues. On the other hand, the same wrongs were
penal in the sense that their redress consisted either (1) in a vengeful
punishment as inspired by customs or the Mosaic “retaliation
principles . . . , or (2) in exacting payments . . . whose function was
propitiatory (amount sufficient to buy off vengeance) rather than
compensatory (amount equal to damage). In the above sense, the
ancient Ethiopian law of wrongs was governed by a system of private
penalty, the action was private, the redress penal, the wrongs not
dichotomized.'
This relatively modest assertion of the state’s interest and power can be
explained by reference to the broad social framework within which the law
functioned. Traditional Ethiopian society was characterized by a subsistence
agricultural economy with a low degree of specialization and exchange. Com
munications in the mountainous Empire were poor. Most people lived in small
The author wishes to thank the International Legal Center of New York for support
ing the research upon which this writing is based.
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communities, where relations between them were, in Gluckman’s phrase, “multi
plex”: people were related to each other by an intricate web of overlapping
rights and obligations expressed in terms of kinship, residence, property, reli
gion and politics? Political power was generally exercised on a local scale, and
the concept of a central, superordinate “state” was more ideal than real. The
weakness of the Empire’s central political institutions was such that an ambi
tious definition of state interest in the penal law would have been unrealistic.
Furthermore, the emphasis in traditional procedure’ upon private conciliatory
and arbitral methods of dispute settlement, rather than on state-imposed punish
ment, permitted the parties afterwards to resume their various relationships in
harmony. In modern, urbanized society, where roles are more specialized,
disputing parties are less often required to maintain continuing relationships
with each other. Society can therefore better tolerate the use of disintegrative,
penal sanctions.
In the thirty year period from 1935 to 1965 the Ethiopian legal system
was completely altered. The modernization process was begun under the aegis
of the brief Italian and British administrations, and later pursued by the govern
ment of Emperor Haile Selassie I. It culminated in the adoption between 1955
and 1965 of a comprehensive series of Western-inspired codes."* Because most
of the received law originated in societies which differ radically from Ethiopia,
one might now expect to find resistance or distortions arising from efforts to
implement the codes. In this paper we shall explore the changes that have
been made in Ethiopia in the victim’s role in criminal prosecutions. After
setting forth the major legal changes, we shall describe the ways in which vic
tims actually participate under the new system. This discussion will show how
persisting traditional norms regarding the victim’s interest in the redress of
personal injuries have significantly affected modernizing reforms in the system
of criminal prosecution.
One can distinguish three prerogatives accorded the victim of an offense
at traditional law: (i) the power to initiate and abrogate a criminal prosecution,
including the application of penal sanctions following adjudication (the “veto
power”); (ii) the power to conduct the criminal prosecution at all stages (“private
prosecution”); and (iii) the right to have one’s claim for civil redress (restitution,
damages, etc.) adjudicated in the same proceeding with the criminal action
(“joinder”). The new Ethiopian codes impose significant restrictions upon each
of these traditional prerogatives of the victim. Although this paper focuses
especially upon changes in private prosecution, we will discuss the veto power
and joinder of civil claims as well.

Evolution of the Victim’s Power to “Veto”
Criminal Prosecution

Before the Italian Occupation in 1935,® there was no system of public
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prosecution in Ethiopia. Personal wrongs were not generally subject to penal
sanctions unless the injured party took appropriate steps to “mobilize” the
law.® The Penal Code of 1930,’ therefore, did not distinguish between
offenses which were punishable only with the victim’s consent, and those
punishable without his consent. The new Penal Code, enacted in 1957, made
most offenses punishable at the instance of public authorities, regardless of
the victim’s attitudes. But a substantial portion of the Code’s several hundred
offenses were made only potential offenses: the prohibited conduct is subject
to prosecution only if the injured party or, in case of his death or incapacity,
his representative, makes a formal complaint to the authorities.* These offenses
we call “complaint offenses.” If the injured party fails to complain within three
months of the time he learns of the offense or of the offender’s identity,’ or if
he withdraws his complaint at any time prior to judgment in the case,*” the
offender may not be convicted. Other provisions, in the 1961 Criminal Proce
dure Code, reinforce the Penal Code distinction between ordinary offenses
and those punishable only upon the victim’s complaint.’*
Although the catalogue of complaint offenses in the Penal Code encom
passes a wide range of wrongful conduct, defying simple classification, it is
clear that the great bulk of offenses actually prosecuted in the Empire fall
within this category.*’ These include minor offenses such as petty theft, minor
assault and trespassing, insult, seduction, and minor offenses committed within
the family. The power to veto prosecution for these offenses by withholding
formal consent allows victims to use the club of threatened state criminal
prosecution to induce an accused to pay compensation in settlement of the
case. This power of victims was very broad under traditional law. By making
serious offenses such as murder, rape, and arson punishable without regard to
the victim’s consent, the Codes have sought generally to reduce the victim’s
influence. And, as we shall explain below,*’ even with regard to complaint
offenses the Codes have increased state power at the victim’s expense by putting
prosecution normally in the hands of government officials. Yet, the retention
of victims’ veto power for many of the most common offenses provides signi
ficant continuity between the traditional and modern systems.** The “com
plaint offense” device thus serves to cushion the impact of state encroachment
upon the victim’s prerogatives in prosecuting offenders.

Prosecution of Offences; Changes in the Law

In Ethiopia before the Italian Occupation there was no government official
whose special duty it was to prosecute criminal offenses. It is not clear which
officials prosecuted “public” criminal offenses such as banditry, blasphemy,
and treason, but apparently there was no specialization of that function. For
the bulk of the offenses, prosecution was by the complainant. The Public
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Prosecutors Proclamation of 1942*® established a system of public prosecution,
headed by an advocate-general (later, “attorney general”) under the Ministry of
Justice. The Proclamation defined “public prosecutor” as “an advocate for the
prosecution of cases before the courts” whose duty was “to prosecute the cases
which affect public security in general.”*® But he was given no monopoly over
this business. The injured party could retain his own advocate in any criminal
prosecution, in which case the Proclamation provided that “the Public Prosecutor
may conduct the prosecution and the advocate so instructed shall act under his
directions.”*’ If the public prosecutor declined to institute a prosecution in any
criminal case the injured party could do so himself or by an advocate;*® the
public prosecutor had no power to prevent prosecution.*’ The Proclamation
said nothing about the victim’s power to “veto” a public prosecution in a case
which had had “settled” with the accused, and it appears that the Proclamation
in that respect abrogated a customary prerogative of the victim. In practice,
though, it is unlikely that prosecutions were commonly instituted in the face
of reconciliation between the accused and the injured party.
The original draft of the Criminal Procedure Code (1961), composed by
the Swiss jurist Professor Jean Graven, substantially adopted the 1942 rules
but modified them to accommodate the “complaint offense” category in the
1957 Penal Code.’’ Under Graven’s draft the injured party would have prose
cuted all complaint offenses, subject to the public prosecutor’s right to inter
vene in particular cases where the public interest so required. However, the
victim’s withdrawal of his complaint would have put an end to the prosecution.
Ordinary offenses (i.e., those punishable even without the victim’s complaint)
were to be prosecuted by the public prosecutor. If, however, the latter declined
to prosecute any offense, the injured party had the right to institute a private
prosecution at his own expense. The final version of the Criminal Procedure
Code did not retain these provisions. Rather, it drastically reduced the oppor
tunity for private prosecution. All offenses, including complaint offenses, were
made subject in the first instance to public prosecution. Only if the public
prosecutor declines to prosecute a complaint offense on the particular ground
that the evidence is insufficient may the injured party now conduct a private
prosecution.’* The court has an obligation in private prosecutions to try to
reconcile the parties before trial.” There is also provision for the public
prosecutor to intervene in any private prosecution where the evidence reveals
that a serious (ordinary) offense has been committed. In that instance the
prosecution is not jointly private/public as it is under the 1942 Proclamation;
instead the private prosecutor is “evicted” from the case.”
“Ordinary” offenses may never be prosecuted privately. If, e.g., the public
prosecutor refuses to institute a prosecution for rape. Article 44(2) of the Code
permits the injured party only to appeal against that refusal in certain cases to
the courts, which then have power to order the public prosecutor to institute
proceedings.’*
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The Code has therefore modernized the system of prosecution by radically
expanding the power of the public prosecutor at the victim’s expense. In this
respect the Code not only moved well beyond the 1942 law, but also surpassed
many modern Western systems in which the victim plays a very significant
prosecutorial role.^’ Since more than ten years have passed since the Code
established this new regime, it is now possible to make some appraisal of how
it has worked in practice. We shall first discuss the victim’s role in relation to
public prosecutions, and then deal with private prosecution.^

The Victim’s Actual Role in Prosecution

The office of the attorney general controls the Empire’s system of public
prosecution. For administrative purposes the Empire is divided into four
geographically defined divisions, each run by an assistant attorney general.
The divisions are; (1) Shoa (excluding Addis Ababa), Arussi, Kafa, and
niubabor; (2) Eritrea, Harergie, Bale, Sidamo, and Gemugofa; (3) Tigrea, Wello,
Begiemeder, Gojjam, and Wellega; (4) Addis Ababa. The head of each of these
divisions sits in Addis Ababa. From there, he exercises responsibility for the
work of the public prosecutors in his division in a variety of ways, chief among
which are responding to their requests for advice,^’ and investigating citizen
complaints about their conduct. The assistant attorneys general, for the second
and third divisions particularly, rely to some extent on the provincial High
Court public prosecutors to give administrative assistance.
There are approximately six hundred and fifty public prosecutors in the
Empire, but only one hundred and sixteen are civilians. The remainder (over
eighty percent of the total) are police officers, who prosecute on a part-time
basis. This fact is important. Although the Code states: “Where a member of
the police force is appointed as a public prosecutor he shall carry out the
instructions of the public prosecution department,”^® the police prosecutor’s
first loyalty is often to the Police Department, upon which his pay, rank, and
tenure all depend. Therefore, police prosecutors tend to function somewhat
independently of the Attorney General’s Office. This can obviously lead to
problems. In addition, police prosecutors as a group are probably less well
educated and have less legal training than their civilian counterparts. While
even the latter have rarely had the benefit of degree training, they have all
studied at least to the Certificate level. Although all police prosecutors might
ultimately be replaced by civilians, it seems likely that for years to come the
police will prosecute cases in the Ethiopian lower courts.
How does this system of public prosecution function in practice vis-d-vis
the injured party? The available evidence reveals that in some respects the
modern law’s restrictions upon the injured party’s role are being ignored or
distorted in favor of traditional values. This is particularly but by no means
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exclusively true at the lower administrative and judicial levels. In some other
respects, however, the new restrictions are administered more rigorously, even,
than the Code demands.
The continued vitality of traditional views is manifested in court cases
which accord extra-legal significance to the defendant’s reconciliation with the
victim. Under the Code a victim can “veto” criminal prosecution at any time
before judgment by withdrawing his complaint, but this only applies to com
plaint offenses, not ordinary offenses such as homicide or rape.” Yet, con
victed murderers frequently appeal for release or reduction of sentence on the
ground that they have reconciled with the injured party, e.g., by giving the
victim’s family a piece of land.’® According to the Penal Code if the accused
has “manifested a sincere repentance for his acts after the offence, in parti
cular ... by repairing, as far as possible, the injury caused by his offense,” his
punishment may be mitigated.’* That provision was probably not intended
to apply to repentance manifested for the first time after sentencing by the
trial court! Yet the courts do not always draw that distinction in reviewing
appeals against sentence.” (The Penal Code does condition both the suspen
sion of sentence” and release on parole’* upon efforts at compensating the
injured party.)
A more extreme illustration of this tendency is the case of Gashaw Hapte
Selassie '/.Attorney General (Sup. Imp. Ct., 1964).” The accused was found
guilty of a double murder and sentenced to death. While he was being tried
before the High Court, it appears, the Emperor agreed to “pardon” him if he
reconciled with both victims’ families. On appeal to the Supreme Court the
accused relied on this “pardon,” which the Court pointed out had not been
fulfilled because the injured parties had refused to reconcile with him. There
fore, the Supreme Court held, the “conditional pardon,” concerning which the
High Court had had a “lengthy correspondence with the Ministry of the Pen,”
was no bar to conviction. This case dramatically illustrates the vitality which
customary penal law retains despite the new law, which of course makes no
provision for “pardon” in the trial stage of proceedings. His Majesty’s court
evidently maintains its traditional intermediary role in reconciling convicts
subject to the death penalty with their victims.’®
The cases discussed above involved pubUc prosecutions where, contrary
to the spirit of the modern law, the victim’s civil interest threatened to pre
dominate. This phenomenon appears in many other forms.” For example,
public prosecutors sometimes illegally authorize private prosecutions of
ordinary offenses.” In one such case, a “private prosecution” for bigamy,
the complainant succeeded in persuading the Awraja Court to set the defen
dant’s bail at E $985, the exact amount which she claimed as damages!”
Frequently one finds the injured party being permitted illegally to take part
40
in a public prosecution by serving summonses on prosecution witnesses,
presenting evidence,** or “appealing” from an acquittal.*’ Until recently
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in hearings at the Emperor’s court to review criminal cases the public prosecutor
often took a “back seat” while the victim argued the case for punishment.
Public prosecutors are also under great pressure to bring unmerited prosecu
tions in order to satisfy the victim’s civil (or vengeful) interests. Too often a pub
lic prosecutor will succumb to this pressure, whether from carelessness, ignorance
or corruption. When this happens the unfortunate defendant can either wait
until trial to prove his innocence,® in which case he might first spend months in
detention, or he can beg relief from the public prosecutor’s superiors in the
Ministry. The attorney general’s office daily receives many citizen complaints
from all over the Empire, and the majority of these emanate from defendants
alleging improper conduct on the part of police officers, prosecutors or judges.
Complaints which appear well founded prompt the relevant divisional assistant
attorney general to issue an order directing a copy of the case file to be sent to
him in Addis Ababa, where it is reviewed. In the great majority of such cases
the decision in Addis Ababa reverses the decision to prosecute. Significantly,
the ground of reversal is frequently that a civil remedy rather than criminal
prosecution was appropriate.
In many cases a clearly innocent defendant is unable to take advantage of
the attorney general’s system of internal appeals because of ignorance, or the
lack of time or money to pursue such a remedy over long distances—for many
complainants come or send their kind personally to Addis Ababa. Such cases
proceed through the criminal courts, from which they occasionally emerge
in a revealing appellate judgment. Thus in 1961 the High Court complained
that:

Hundreds of [criminal trespass) cases come before the courts in
their criminal jurisdiction where attempts are made to prove the
ownership of land in dispute . . . The main object of Article 650
of the Penal Code [“Disturbance of Possession”) is not to decide
questions of ownership (this is a matter fitter for the civil
courts).. .
In such cases the complainant attempts to use the criminal process to settle a
botw fide property dispute and, at the same time, make life unhappy for his
adversary.**
Frequently, of course, the local public prosecutor frustrates the com
plainant by refusing to prosecute an accused. Unless a complaint offence is
involved, which situation we discuss below, the Code does not permit the
alleged victim to prosecute privately. His sole recourse under the law (assuming
the public prosecutor’s refusal is based on Article 42(l)(a)*’ —insufficiency of
®The Code does not provide for any pre-trial judicial review of the charge to ascertain
whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the prosecution.
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evidence), is described in Code Articles 44(2) and 45, which permit him to ask
the court to review the reasons for the refusal and “either confirm the decision
of the public prosecutor or order him to institute proceedings.” It is interesting
to note that very few complainants take advantage of the appeal permitted by
these articles. Most often they ignore the courts and instead pursue the avenue
of internal administrative appeal which we have described above: some com
plain to the public prosecutor at the next highest level of court, and others
appeal directly to the attorney general in Addis Ababa. This is probably simply
because they are ignorant of their right under Article 44(2), for it is neither
the public prosecutors’ legal duty, nor their practice, to inform complainants
of their right to appeal judicially.'** On the other hand, the preference for
executive rather than judicial review may reflect the novelty in Ethiopia, still,
of the idea that mere judges have sufficient power to correct executive mis
conduct.
Some frustrated complainants do appeal under Article 44(2),*’ and the few
available court judgments from such cases are rather interesting. In ten cases
which we found decided in the period 1968-1972 there was only one where the
victim succeeded in reversing the prosecutor’s decision.*® In five cases the
court confirmed the prosecutor’s refusal after reviewing his reasons,*’ and in
two cases it referred the case to the attorney general for his opinion.®® While
these cases show judicial support of the public prosecution department as
against the victim, a recent Supreme Court case, Admasu Ejigu v. Public Prose
cutor,^^ reflects a contrasting view. This case did not arise from a victim’s
appeal under Code Article 44(2) from the public prosecutor’s refusal to institute
proceedings, but from the latter’s withdrawal of the charge after proceedings
had begun. The five original defendants included two local chiefs of police
and the mayor of a municipality, who were charged with trespass and damage
to the complainant’s property. After the start of trial, however, the public
prosecutor informed the court that he was withdrawing the charge on instruc
tions from the attorney general, because the trespass and damage had occurred
in the course of justifiable police action under law. The trial court permitted
the withdrawal under Code Article 112, rejecting the complainant’s demand
that evidence be produced in support of the reasons alleged therefor.®’ The
complainant successfully appealed this ruling, the Supreme Court holding that
the public prosecutor “must show cause [to the trial court] why the Attorney
General wanted to withdraw the charge.” Merely to recite the attorney
general’s instruction was not sufficient.
The Admasu Ejigu case is interesting for several reasons. First, the Supreme
Court seems to have misinterpreted the language of Code Article 122, which was
probably intended to give the attorney general complete discretion to authorize
withdrawal of a prosecution, without giving any justifying reasons to the victim
or to the court.
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(2) Where the public prosecutor informs the court that the with
drawal of a charge is on the instructions of government, the court
shall, if it is satisfied that the public prosecutor has been so ordered,
grant permission to the public prosecutor to withdraw the charge.
(emphasis added)
This mandatory language contrasts with that of the preceding section. Article
122(1), which expressly requires the prosecutor to obtain the court’s permis
sion for ordinary withdrawals. Article 122(2) seems clearly to require the court
to grant permission for government ordered withdrawals, and therefore there
is no need for proof of the supporting reasons. Second, it is interesting that the
Supreme Court permitted the victim’s appeal at all, for there is nothing in the
Code which allows the complainant in a public prosecution to appeal a with
drawal of the charge. (In fact, the lack of any such provision seriously weakens
the value of Article 44(2), since even a successful appeal against an initial refusal
to prosecute could not prevent a later withdrawal of the charge.) Both in per
mitting the complainant to appeal, and in deciding the case as it did, the Supreme
Court deferred to the victim’s interest beyond what was required or permitted
by the Code. Yet, on policy grounds its decision may have been praiseworthy.
The Admasu Ejigu case asserts the value of victim participation in proceedings
where the public have reason to doubt the impartiality of government prose
cutors in exercising their discretionary powers. Because the defendants were
themselves executive office-holders, fairness may have required review of the
case by a separate and independent branch of government—the judiciary.
Some Ethiopian courts also show considerable deference to the injured
party at a later juncture in the criminal process—appeals from acquittals.
Just as complainants may exert considerable pressure and influence on the
public prosecutor’s decision to institute proceedings initially, they may be
very active in later stages. Should a public prosecution terminate in the defen
dant’s acquittal, the victim will generally urge the prosecutor to take an appeal,
as the latter may do under Article 181. The public prosecutor s discretion in
this matter is completely unrestricted by the Code. He need not consult with
or inform the complainant of a negative decision, and the latter has no standing
to contest or appeal the same. In practice, however, we find complainants con
testing such decisions much as they contest the prosecutor’s decisions at earlier
stages. The favored route is once again internal administrative appeal. Although
the law does not entitle him to it, the complainant may somehow obtain a copy
of the case file from the trial court registrar, and bring it to the attorney gen
eral’s office. There his complaint will be processed by the appropriate divisional
authorities, and the public prosecutor’s decision not to appeal either upheld or
reversed.
Sometimes a victim offended by the public prosecutor’s refusal to appeal
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against a defendant s acquittal will resort to more direct action than complaint
within the Ministry. He will simply go to the trial court registry and himself
enter an appeal! Although this is quite contrary to law the registrar, out of
ignorance or corruption, may allow it. When the appeal papers are finally sent
up to the court having appellate jurisdiction, the public prosecutor assigned to
that court will review the case, and will frequently agree to argue the appeal
despite the reluctance of his colleague below. Frustrated victims have also
been successful occasionally in getting a judge of the appeal court to order the
public prosecutor to take an appeal. This might be seen as the operation of
Article 44(2) “by analogy” at the appeal stage, but of course the Code does
not authorize any such role for the victim in public prosecutions.
Thus far in this section we have been discussing the injured party’s role
in the prosecution of ordinary offenses. As we noted above, ordinary offenses
are not subject to private prosecution, which is permitted only when the public
prosecutor refuses to prosecute a complaint offense on the ground of insufficient
evidence (Art. 42(1 )(a)). Although we could discover no statistical informa
tion on the extent of private prosecution in Ethiopia, observers seem to agree
on its rarity.
How can this be explained? Several relevant factors should be
mentioned. First, as discussed above, public prosecutors are often willing to
prosecute complaint offenses, even though the evidence may appear doubtful.
Second, where prosecution is refused under Article 42(1 )(a) the victim invariably
resorts to internal administrative appeal, rather than instituting a private prose
cution. The latter phenomenon is explained by the normal desire to save the
time and expense involved in a private prosecution, if the public prosecutor
might be compelled to handle it free of cost.^^ There is also a psychological
advantage, perhaps, to facing one’s adversary through an official of the state.
But there are many cases where administrative appeal fails to procure a public
prosecution. Still, only a handful of private prosecutions are authorized each
year, and fewer still conducted. It may be that most complainants would not
find the expense of private prosecution worth their while, and would only be
interested in using the threat of criminal prosecution as a bargaining counter
in negotiations with the accused over civil aspects of the dispute. But then,
why are so few private prosecutions even authorized? Probably, it seems,
because victims are generally ignorant of their right under Article 44(1) to
prosecute privately. The public prosecution department does not act to dispel
this ignorance. The Code (Art. 43) provides that the public prosecutor’s
refusal to prosecute under Article 42 must be in writing, and a copy sent to
the persons entitled under Article 47 to conduct a private prosecution.
Article 44(1) then directs that where his refusal under Article 42(1 )(a) relates
to a complaint offense, the public prosecutor “shall authorize" the complainant
“in writing” to conduct a private prosecution (emphasis supplied). Because for
reasons we shall discuss below the public prosecution department has no reason
to encourage private prosecution, these Code provisions are administered rather

ROLE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN ETHIOPIA

83

restrictively. In practice, the public prosecutor frequently does not send a copy
of his refusal to the victim, as Article 43 requires. Even if a copy is sent, the
form set out in the Code” merely informs the victim of the public prosecutor’s
reason for refusal, but does not mention the victim’s right to institute private
proceedings. Whether or not a form is sent, public prosecutors generally do not
volunteer information about the right to private prosecution. Nor do they
automatically authorize the victim to conduct such a prosecution; the “shall
authorize” language of Article 44(1) is in effect interpreted to mean “shall,
if the complainant so requests, authorize him in writing ... This restrictive
interpretation, coupled with the policy of reticence to communicate the victim s
rights, no doubt contributes significantly to the disuse of Article 44(1) (authori
zation of private prosecutions), and possibly also to the infrequency with which
private prosecutions are actually conducted. After all, the average complainant
is neither represented by counsel nor himself aware of the contents of the

Criminal Procedure Code.
Public prosecutors’ apparent lack of enthusiasm for private prosecution is
based on more than a dislike of “competition.” A major weakness of private
prosecution under the 1961 Code is that it permits—indeed, exclusively per
mits—prosecution in cases where the public prosecutor has found that there
is not sufficient evidence to justify a conviction.”” In some instances there
may be no evidence whatsoever that an offense has even been committed. Yet
authorization of a private prosecution starts a criminal prosecution which,
because of the Code fails to provide any pre-trial judicial screening device,
subjects the accused to trial so long as the complainant favors that course.
Indeed, a defendant might conceivably spend several months in jail while
awaiting trial on a charge for which there is “not sufficient evidence to justify
a conviction.”” Although Ethiopian law would impose both civil and
criminal^ liability upon a complainant who knowingly subjected an innocent
person to private prosecution, the deterrent efficacy of such remedies is open
to doubt. It is understandable, therefore, if the public prosecution department
is reluctant to facilitate private prosecutions, which permit an obviously inno
cent accused to undergo the threatened expense, embarrassment, and jeopardy
of a public trial at the alleged victim’s discretion.
Before concluding, we shall briefly consider the evolution of the third and
final aspect of the victim’s traditional prerogative in Ethiopia—the ability to
have his civil and “penal” claims adjudicated in a single proceeding.

Joinder of the Victim’s Civil Action

The 1930 Penal Code continued the customary arrangement of permitting
simultaneous adjudication of the accused’s criminal and civil liability.®’ Like
the notions of “complaint offense” and private prosecution, joinder of the civil
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and criminal proceedings is also a common feature of contemporary European
codes relied upon by the 1957 Penal Code drafter.®^ The new Penal Code
accordingly provided for joinder, although it was restricted more than tradi
tionallyThe Criminal Procedure Code, enacted four years later, provided
further details.^ The procedure requires the injured party to make applica
tion for joinder to the criminal court “at the opening of the [trial] hearing.”
Joinder applications may be made with regard to all offenses, complaint and
ordinary, and whether the prosecution is public or private. The court must
deny the application if, on its own motion or at the instance of the defense
or prosecution, it finds any of six impediments®’ to exist: (1) the accused is
a juvenile; (2) the accused is being tried in absentia; (3) the complainant has
already started the civil action; (4) this complainant is not qualified to sue;
(5) “the claim for compensation cannot be determined without calling
numerous witnesses in addition to those to be called by the prosecution and
defense”; or (6) hearing the civil claim for compensation “is likely to confuse,
complicate or delay” the criminal proceeding. If the application is approved,
then the injured party may participate in the trial “and shall have with regard
to evidence all of the rights of an ordinary party.” However, the court may
not adjudicate the civil claim unless it convicts the accused on the criminal
charge; if the accused is acquitted or discharged, the injured party may re-file
his civil suit in the civil courts. If the accused is found guilty and ordered to
pay compensation to the victim, but lacks the means to pay, the court may
order payment to be made out of such sources as fines, or the yield of the
accused’s labor.®®
There are no statistical data on the volume of applications for joinder in
Ethiopian courts, but it is said in Addis Ababa to be very insubstantial. Explana
tions for this vary, but just as with private prosecution, the victim’s ignorance
of his rights is undoubtedly a major factor. The Code requires neither the
public prosecutor nor the judge to inform the complainant at any stage of his
right to apply for joinder.®’ Nor does either one of them volunteer this advice
in practice. Furthermore, the judges are said to strictly enforce the Code’s
requirement that an application for joinder be made at the beginning of trial;
should the victim request a compensation order at the time of judgment, it will
be refused.*’ It is unlikely, in any event, that many complainants are aware of
their right to apply for compensation in the criminal courts.
Even if the right were better known, joinder might not be very frequent
for several reasons. First, the judges seem quite imbued with the modern civilcriminal dichotomy, and are not enthusiastic about adjudicating civil matters
in their criminal courts.®® Second, the law is drawn so broadly that in effect
it gives judges complete discretion to deny an application for joinder. Joinder
*’By contrast the Yugoslav and German systems permit an application for joinder to

be made until the end of the trial.
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is not permitted if the civil claim is “likely to . .. complicate or delay” the
criminal case-a finding which could be made in almost any suit. Third, the
code gives very little guidance on the procedure to be followed once joinder
is allowed: what should be the order of testimony, what rules of evidence
should govern, etc.? The prospect of solving these problems de novo might
deter judges from allowing joinder. While reforms could be enacted through
legislation or court rules to deal with some of these obstacles to joinder, none
of them would be effective unless victims were somehow made aware of their
right to apply for joinder.

Conclusions
During the last thirty or forty years the Ethiopian law of crimes and pro
secution has moved very rapidly in a direction familiar to—and directly
influenced by—the experience of Western nations. From a time when most
personal wrongs were defined and prosecuted as primarily affecting the victim s
private interests, the law has shifted dramatically to assert-both in substance
and procedure—the state’s primary interest in the suppression of personal wrongs.
We have shown that this shift required restriction of the victim s former prerog
atives in three closely related aspects: his power to initiate and veto the applica
tion of penal sanctions against the offender, his power to conduct prosecutions,
and his ability to claim satisfaction of his civil claims in the same proceeding
which adjudicates the offender’s penal liability. Two critical devices for
achieving these changes were the creation of a public prosecution department
with power to initiate and conduct prosecutions of a broad range of penal
offenses, and the adoption of a sharp dichotomy between civil and criminal
courts and proceedings. But the new laws did not attempt a complete rejec
tion of the victim’s role in criminal proceedings. Some continuity was preserved
in the form of minor “complaint offenses,” which may be compromised by
settlement between the victim and defendant, and which in certain instances
are subject to private prosecution. Another element of continuity is found in
the retention of “joinder” procedures, but also under tight limitations.
Our discussion of the way in which the transformed systeiri operates in
practice suggests several conclusions. Most striking is that the system of public
prosecution operates under great pressure from traditional victim-oriented
values, leading complainants, defendants, prosecutors, judges and court regis
trars to accord extra-legal significance to the victim’s role in public prosecu
tions. Although the public prosecution system under the codes was intended
to usurp the victim’s prerogatives, at times it thus seems as if the victim has
instead co-opted the public prosecution system. This is seen particularly in
the fact that private prosecution is rare, but public prosecutors are influenced
to bring many unmeritorious public prosecutions which primarily serve the
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victim’s civil or vengeful interest. Against this tide of unmeritorious actions,
which are predominantly civil suits in criminal disguise, the attorney general’s
staff wages continuous battle.
The future for private prosecution seems quite dim, not merely because
of official hostility engendered by the abuses to which it can be put, but
because victims quite naturally prefer to wage battle behind the thick (and
inexpensive) armor of state prosecution. The use of joinder procedures to
adjudicate the defendant’s civil liability to the victim in the criminal proceed
ings seems also destined to disuse, barring the unlikely prospect that judges or
public prosecutors will assume responsibility for encouraging complainants to
apply for compensation, or at least inform them of their right to do so.
In every country, the law governing the redress of personal wrongs reflects
a particular balance among the interests of three “parties”: the alleged offender,
the victim, and the state. It seems ironic that while in Ethiopia the system is
moving inexorably in the direction of excluding the victim from considera
tion in the criminal process, in some Western countries the pendulum may
have begun to swing the other way. In England and the United States, there
appears to have been increased attention recently to the victim’s stake, reflected
not only in a revived interest in “victimology” and state “victim compensation
schemes,” but in discussion of such notions as “criminal bankruptcy,”®’ in
increasing advocacy of victim-oriented correctional devices such as compensa
tion and restitution in lieu of incarceration,™ and in recognition of the victim’s
interest in challenging the public prosecutor’s refusal to institute criminal
proceedings.’*
In this last respect, the interaction between victim, court, prosecutor, and
central prosecution department discussed in this writing suggests the value of
further research, in other legal systems, of the victim’s role in low-visibility
decision making at the initial and appellate stages of public prosecution. We
know very little about the victim’s actual participation at all stages of the
criminal process. Without more empirical data it is difficult to assess the
comparative value of systems which differ substantially in the formal role
allocated to victims. One suspects that despite marked differences in the law
as written, there are underlying uniformities in the degree and type of actual
victim participation in all societies of approximately equivalent social and
economic conditions. In any case, these two questions deserve further atten
tion from students of victimology: What role do victims play in criminal pro
secutions? What role should victims play?
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